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Abstract
Very poor households may be excluded from public programs intended for
their beneﬁt for a variety of reasons such as lack information, a permanent
residence or membership in social networks. We are interested in methods of
testing for such exclusion based on independently drawn samples of program
participants and non-participants. We discuss three alternative nonparametric
procedures; sign tests, tests for stochastic dominance and a test for distribution
crossing. In the cases where there is a poverty threshold below which program
participation is diﬃcult, our simulation results suggest that the last of these test
procedures is the most powerful. We apply this test to data from a microﬁnance
program in India and ﬁnd evidence that the poorest households in the area were
largely outside the program.
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11 Introduction
Every public program faces the challenge of reaching intended beneﬁciaries. Docu-
mented deﬁciencies in many older social transfer mechanisms have led governments,
non-government organizations and donor institutions to embrace institutions which
use innovative methods of transferring resources to poor households. Some of these
(such as the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh), provide credit to poor households for
micro-enterprises, some (like social funds in Peru), subsidize investments in social
and physical infrastructure and others (such as the Employment Guarantee Schemes
in India) provide opportunities for employment on local infrastructure projects during
periods of food scarcity. Central to evaluating the success of these programs is an
assessment of how well they target the poor.
While many of the programs mentioned above have transformed the lives of mil-
lions of households, there is some concern that they may not be adequately serving the
very poor. These households may be inadequately informed, educated or nourished
to take advantage of these programs, they may not possess required documents such
as birth certiﬁcates or proofs of residence, they may be socially ostracized, or agency
problems may lead bureaucrats to direct resources to other groups. Morduch (1998)
ﬁnds that eligibility rules are often violated in microcredit programs in Bangladesh.
There is also empirical evidence from a variety of social programs in both developed
and developing countries that information sets diﬀer among those eligible, and that
participation rates are sensitive to program design.1
Estimates and tests of poverty targeting based on parametric models could be
misleading without enough prior information on the set of households that may be
vulnerable to exclusion. Social programs to reduce poverty are designed to exclude
wealthy households, leading us to expect mean incomes to be lower among partici-
pants than non-participants. If these programs also exclude the poorest households,
and these are a small fraction of the population, we may not detect such neglect in a
1Heckman and Smith (2003) use data from a job training program and shows how information
can have signiﬁcant eﬀects on participation. Atkinson (1995) compares family allowance programs
in Western Europe in the post-war period and discusses the role of diﬀerences in design.comparison of means across the two groups. Intutively, this is because popular para-
metric procedures typically estimate conditional means and diﬀerences in the tails of
conditional distributions may not be reﬂected in their means. This is well illustrated
in Paxson and Schady (2002) where logit estimates indicate that the beneﬁts from
investments in infrastructure are decreasing in income, but nonparametric regressions
reveal that the poorest 7% of households are less likely to beneﬁt than the slightly
richer ones.
In this paper we describe three nonparametric procedures that could be used to
compare diﬀerences in the tails of two distributions. We are interested in evaluating
the appropriateness of these procedures in testing for whether the poorest households
in the population have been neglected by a program.
The simplest procedure we consider is the sign test, based on the number of
participants in the sample below a given population quantile. If, for example, the
share of participants in the bottom income quartile of the population is signiﬁcantly
lower than 25% we would expect the bottom quarter of our sample (ordered by
income) to contain fewer participants than non-participants for equal sample sizes of
the two groups. This popular nonparametric test is fairly crude in that it relies only
on the number of sample observations below a certain income threshold and is not
sensitive to the levels of income corresponding to these observations.
Our second set of procedures are tests for stochastic dominance. If program
participants are mainly poor, but the program in inaccessible to those below a certain
threshold level of income, x0, we would expect the distribution of participants and
non-participants to cross at some income x∗ > x0 with the distribution of participants,
F(x), below that of non-participants, G(x), for incomes below x∗ with the reverse
true above x∗. Suppose we classify households as poor if their incomes lie in some
interval [a,b]. In this case, there will be no ﬁrst order stochastic dominance over any
such interval if it includes x∗. It may however be the case that F(x) second-order
stochastically dominates G(x) over [a,b]. This would be evidence of an anti-poor
bias in the program. Second-order stochastic dominance is closely related to Lorenz
dominance and discussions and tests for both these orderings have now appeared in
the literature on inequality and poverty measurement (Foster and Shorrocks, 1988,
2Bishop et. al., 1992, Anderson, 1996). We discuss this literature more fully in Section
2.
The last procedure we consider explicitly tests for a crossing of the distributions
of participants and non-participants and also estimates the crossing point. These
estimated crossing points provides us with an upper bound on the income of the
set of households that have been neglected by the program. This approach has the
advantage of detecting non-monotonicities in inclusion probabilities, even over small
ranges of the income distribution under very general distributional assumptions. It
also requires no prior information on the income interval in which such a crossing
might occur.
We compare the three tests through simulations on pairs of income distributions
which we consider plausible for participants and non-participants in a public pro-
gram. Each pair is chosen so that the distribution of participants crosses that of
non-participants from below, reﬂecting the relative exclusion of households below
a certain minimum income threshold. No ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance relation
therefore exists. We have constructed our examples so that second-order stochastic
dominance holds in two out of 3 cases.
We experiment with diﬀerent sample sizes and ﬁnd the test of distribution crossing
to be the most powerful in rejecting a null of equal distributions in most of our
simulations. Simulation results are in Section 3. For all three pairs of distributions
we consider, the power of this test rapidly converges to 1 as sample sizes increase. The
simulations lead us to the conclusion that if there is reason to believe, a priori, that
there is a unique threshold below which program participation is diﬃcult, the tests
for distribution crossing are the most powerful. In contrast, there are two principal
drawbacks to using tests for second-order stochastic dominance in this context. The
ﬁrst is that such dominance will only occur if the crossing point of the two distributions
x∗ is close to the endpoint b of the interval of interest. These test cannot therefore
detect the exclusion of poor households if the fraction excluded is relatively small and
in the tail of the income distribution. The second problem relates to the test statistics
currently available in the literature. These are mainly union-intersection tests and
are therefore usually conservative and have low power unless the distributions being
3considered are suﬃciently diﬀerent from each other.
In Section 4, we apply the above methods to test for poverty targeting in a rapidly
growing microﬁnance program in India. We collected data on living standards for a
sample of households entering the program and randomly chosen non-participant
households in the same area. We use this survey data to construct an economic index
which can proxy for income and compare the distributions of this index for members of
newly formed microcredit groups to randomly chosen non-members in the area. The
two empirical distribution functions cross. We estimate the crossing point of these
distributions and test for distribution crossing. Our results are statistically signiﬁcant
and suggest that the poorest 5% of households in the area are disproportionately
outside the program. Based on their levels of education and their pariticipation in a
government program for subsidized foodgrains, it seems that they are also excluded
from other programs aimed at poverty alleviation.
Although much of our discussion and our empirical work refers to targeting in
poverty alleviation programs, the methods proposed are of more general applicabil-
ity. They can be used in a variety of situations where the crossing of population
distributions is of interest. For example, students in some schools may come from
the tails of an income distribution (because the school may admit you either if you
are very wealthy or poor and intelligent) while others come from the middle. Some
ﬁrms may hire some very able managers and low skill workers while others might
hire employees of similar ability. Estimates and tests for distribution crossings can be




Almost all the nonparametric procedures we consider are based on empirical estimates
of the population distribution functions for each group. These are standard in the
literature, but for the sake of completeness, we begin with a deﬁnition.








where I(A) is the indicator function of the set A and N is the number of sample
observations.
HN(x) is a step function with jumps at the order statistics of the sample. The
Glivenko-Cantelli theorem (Fisz, 1963), establishes that the empirical distribution
function converges uniformly to the population distribution function with probability
one.
We denote the distribution of income in the population by F(x) for participants
and by G(x) for non-participants. Sample sizes for participants and non-participants
are denoted by n and m respectively and the two samples are denoted by X1,...,Xn
and Y1,...,Ym.
2.2 Test Statistics
2.2.1 General Tests for Comparing Distributions
We begin by brieﬂy discussing two popular nonparametric tests; the Kolmogorov
Smirnov test for the equality of two distributions and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
test for ﬁrst order stochastic dominance. We point out why it is desirable to go
beyond these for the particular problem we are interested in and discuss tests that
we believe are appropriate in our context.
The Kolmogorov Smirnov test is used to test the null hypothesis of equal distribu-
tions against the very general alternative that the distributions are unequal. The test
is based on the maximum diﬀerence between the two empirical distribution functions.
Large values of the statistic are evidence against equal distributions and lead to the
rejection of null hypothesis. The generality of the alternative hypothesis makes it
widely applicable. It also means however that rejection of the null is not very infor-
mative in terms of ordering the two distributions. Kolmogrov tests are often used
5for preliminary studies of data since the alternatives involved are very general. As a
consequence, the rejection of the null provides us with very little information which
can be used to compare the two distributions.
The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test can be used to examine whether one distribu-
tion ﬁrst order stochastically dominates the other. If we ﬁnd evidence of stochastic
dominance of the distribution of non-participants, the program can be judged to be
successful in targeting the poor. The test statistic is based on the number of times an
X precedes a Y in the combined ordered arrangement of the two independent random
samples X1,X2,...,Xn and Y1,Y2,...,Ym into a single sequence of m + n = N vari-
ables, increasing in magnitude. If a program successfully targets poor households, we
would expect the sample of X’s to generally precede the Y’s and the test would pro-
vide support for the stochastic dominance of the distribution of non-participants. The
reverse would be true if the program was anti-poor. The test statistic is asymptoti-
cally normal and is distribution-free under the null hypothesis. Its power compares
very well with parametric tests when the latter are appropriate.2
If there is in fact a threshold level of household income below which participation
in a program is negligible, the population distributions of participants F(x) will cross
that of non participants from below. There will be no ﬁrst order stochastic dominance
of either distribution in this case. These tests will not, in that case provide us with
any information about the alternative we are interested in.
We now discuss tests that are appropriate when population distributions cross.
2.2.2 Sign Tests
A sign test is a popular procedure to test for population quantiles. The relevant
population quantile is the level of household income below which we are interested in
comparing the shares of participants and non-participants. In terms of the notation
we have been using so far, this population quantile would correspond to the endpoint
b of the income interval of interest [a,b], with a = 0.
2See Gibbons and Chakraborti (1992), chapter 7, for derivations of these test statistics and their
distributions and Hettmansperger (1984) for power comparisons.
6To elaborate, suppose we wanted to test the null hypothesis that the level of
income was irrelevant for program participation of households in the lowest income
quartile. We would ﬁrst ﬁnd the value of household income in our sample below which
25% of sample households lie. This sample quantile, given by the income of the m+n
4
th
ordered observation, is a consistent estimate of the corresponding population quantile.
This can be used to test the null hypothesis against the alternative that the fraction
is less than .25. Rejection of the null would support the claim that households with
incomes in the bottom quartile are disproportionately excluded from the program.
The test statistic is based on the number of observations for participants, Sn
that are below the relevant sample quantile. Sn has a binomial distribution with
parameters n (the size of the sample of participants) and p (the population fraction
below the income quantile being used). As long as sample sizes are reasonable, critical
values for the test can be based on the normal approximation. In the simulations
exercises described below, we use p = .25 and p = .05 as alternative cutoﬀs for the
sign test.
2.2.3 Tests for second-order Stochastic Dominance
If the distributions of participants and non-participants cross, we cannot rank them
in terms of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. We may, however, be able to rank them
in terms of higher orders of stochastic dominance.
Deﬁnition 2 We say that the distribution of participants, F(x), dominates that of







Higher orders of stochastic dominance are deﬁned by the ordering of higher order
integrals of these distributions. Note that stochastic dominance of order r always
implies stochastic dominance of order (r + 1) but the reverse is not true.
If two distributions cross at an income level close to the end point b of the interval
of interest, F(x) is likely to dominate G(x) in second-order. A test which supports
7such an alternative, against the null of equal distributions, therefore provides evi-
dence supporting the exclusion of households in the interval [a,b]. If however, the
distributions cross at an income level close to a, such a test would be relatively un-
informative. Loosely speaking, the closer the income corresponding to the crossing
point is to a, the higher the order of stochastic dominance we need to consider to
rank these distributions.
Several test procedures are available for testing second-order stochastic domi-
nance and the related concept of Lorenz dominance. Bishop, Fromby and Thistle
(1992) and Beach and Davidson (1983) propose tests for Lorenz dominance based
on sample quantiles. Deshpande and Singh (1985) provide a one sample statistical
test for second-order stochastic dominance when one distribution is known. Schmid
and Trede (1998) consider the dominance of F over G when the supports of F and
G are contained in [0,1] and G is uniform. Since very little in known in practice
about the distributions of participants and non-participants in a program, we re-
strict ourselves to tests which can be used for any (unknown) speciﬁcation of the two
distributions. Moreover, since we are interested in poverty rather than inequality we
focus on second-order stochastic dominance rather than Lorenz dominance. Anderson
(1996) proposes a test for second-order stochastic dominance based on a comparison
of frequencies for the groups in pre-determined income intervals and which does not
use any information on the actual levels of income within these intervals. Davidson
and Duclos (2000) and Kaur, Prakasa Rao and Singh (1994) propose the same test
statistic for testing second-order stochastic dominance at a ﬁxed point in the interval
of interest. Kaur, Prakasa Rao and Singh then use the inﬁmum of these statistics to
test for second-order stochastic dominance. We favor their approach over the others
in the literature since their test is consistent and they have carefully identiﬁed all
points of change in the statistic over the interval of interest.
A thorough discussion of the usefulness of how higher orders of stochastic dom-
inance can be used for poverty measurement is beyond the scope of this paper. We
refer the reader to Chakravarty and Muliere (2003) and Davidson and Duclos (2000)
for a review of some of the important literature in this area. We restrict ourselves
here to two comments that are relevant to the question we are interested in, namely,
8testing the exclusion of the very poor from a public program. The ﬁrst is that most
available tests for second-order stochastic dominance that are distribution free are
based on the union-intersection principle. This means that the hypothesis being
tested is based on several simple hypotheses and the test statistic is a function of the
statistics from these simpler tests. In the case of Kaur, Prakasa Rao and Singh (1994)
for example, this means that the integrals of the empirical distribution functions for
the two groups are compared at several points in the income interval [a,b] which is of
interest and the test statistic is based on the smallest diﬀerence between the integral
estimates in this interval.
Most tests for second-order stochastic dominance tend to have low power and
often yield conﬂicting results when applied to the same data (Davidson and Duclos
(2000)). This is not surprising since these test statistics are sensitive to each of the
points in the interval in which the comparison is made and are therefore very sensitive
to outliers in the sample. Diﬀerent statistics are sensitive to diﬀerent types of outliers
and therefore yield conﬂicting results unless the sample error is small relative to
diﬀerences in the population distributions. The second observation is that when the
crossing of participant and non-participant distributions is close to the bottom of the
income interval of interest, we require tests for higher orders of stochastic dominance
and very little is known about the properties of these types of tests.
In the simulations below, we use the test for second-order stochastic dominance
given by Kaur, Prakasa Rao and Singh (1994) because it is not based on arbitrarily
determined quantiles and the behavior of the statistic within the interval of interest
is well studied. The calculation of the statistic used in our simulations is reproduced
in the appendix for easy reference.
2.2.4 Tests for Distribution Crossing
We now turn to explicit tests for distribution crossing. These tests are appropriate if
there is reason to believe that there is a single crossing in our interval of interest. This
would be true if income is the main determinant of participation and the program
ﬁnds it diﬃcult to reach households below a certain income threshold. They have the
9added advantage of providing an estimate of the crossing point, which is an upper
bound on the incomes of the set of households who are relatively neglected by the
program.
Hawkins and Kochar (1991) and Chen et al. (2002) have considered point as well
as interval estimation of the crossing point x∗. We derive estimates of the crossing
point based on the methodology in Chen et al. (2002) which we summarize here.
Suppose that limN→∞ m/N = γ for some γ ∈ (0,1). Let Z1,...,ZN be the
combined sample of X0s and Y 0s and Z(1) < Z(2) < ...,Z(N) be the order statistics
of this sample. We wish to test
H0 : F(x) = G(x)
against the alternative
HA : F(x) < G(x) when x < x∗ and G(x) < F(x) when x > x∗.
Chen et al. (2002) proposed the following supremum-type criterion function for
testing H0 against HA:
λ(x) = sup
t≤x
(G(t) − F(t)) + sup
x≤t
(F(t) − G(t)) − |F(x) − G(x)|.
They prove that under the null hypothesis λ(x) = 0 and under the alternative
hypothesis the crossing point x∗ is the unique maximizer of λ(x). An estimate of λ(x)




(Gm(t) − Fn(t)) + sup
x≤t
(Fn(t) − Gm(t)) − |Fn(x) − Gm(x)|.
Since empirical distribution functions are step functions with jump points as order














for testing H0 against HA. Exact critical points for small samples are tabulated in
Chen et al. (1998). The asymptotic distribution is not standard and the authors ob-
tain asymptotic critical regions using Monte-Carlo simulations. The relevant critical
value is presented with our simulation results below.
Since the empirical distribution functions are only estimates of the population
distribution functions, we may encounter multiple crossings in our sample even if
the population distributions exhibit a unique crossing point. In the case of multiple
estimates of the crossing point, we use the smallest value since this is our most
conservative estimate of the upper bound on income of the households neglected by
the program.
3 Simulation Results
We now compare the test procedures described above using simulated data from
three alternative pairs of distributions for participants and non-participants. In each
case, the distributions cross with the participant distribution intersecting that of
non-participants from below. We rely mainly on alternative parameterizations of
Weibull distributions since these are reasonable approximations for observed income
distributions and are easy to work with.
We ﬁrst consider an example that has been used in both Hawkins and Kochar
(1991) and Chen et al (2002). We include it here for purposes of comparison. The
income of participant households, F(x) has an exponential distribution and that of
non-participants a Weibull distribution:
F1(x) = 1 − e
−x2
,




11The two distribution cross at x = 1.13 and 72% of the population of each group lies
to the left of this point. F second-order stochastically dominates G for all possible
intervals in [0,1].
Our second example has been chosen so that almost the entire population is to
the left of the crossing point. Second-order stochastic dominance of F is therefore
strongest here. The distributions
F2(x) = 1 − e
−( x
3)3





cross at x = 6.75.
In our last example,
F3(x) = 1 − e
−( x
2)3





the distributions cross at x = 8/9. Only 9% of each group has incomes below this
point. As expected, there is no second-order stochastic dominance of either distribu-
tion.





































Figure 2 : F2(x) = 1 − e−( x
3)3


















Figure 3: F3(x) = 1 − e−( x
2)3
,G3(x) = 1 − e−( x
3)2
For each of these pairs, we consider 2 sample sizes (i) n = m = 20 and (ii)
n = m = 50 and perform 5,000 iterations. We have used the same sample sizes and
number of iterations used by Chen et al. to facilitate comparison between the tests.
For the crossing test we use the simulated 5% critical point of 1.529 given in Chen
et al.(2002). For the sign test for the ﬁrst two examples, we count the proportion
of observations to the left of the N/4th observation in the combined sample. This
is therefore a test for whether the proportion of participants in the bottom income
quartile of the population is less than 25%. For the third example, there is an early
13Table 1: Power comparisons for three nonparametric tests.
Distributions Sample Crossing SSD Sign Sign
sizes Test Test Test Test
(p = .25) (p = .05)
F1,G1 n=m=20 0.485 0.187 0.185
n=m=50 0.899 0.25 0.664 .
F2,G2 n=m=20 0.577 0.759 0.312
n=m=50 0.960 0.878 0.927
F3,G3 n=m=20 0.623 - 0.003
n=m=50 0.974 - 0
crossing of the two distributions and we therefore test for proportions in the poorest
5% of the population by counting the proportion of observations to the left of the
N/20th observation in the combined sample. We use critical values based on the
standard normal distribution.
Computing the power for tests of second-order schochastic dominance is more
complicated because even for large samples, we ﬁnd simulated critical values to be
considerably diﬀerent from those of the standard normal distribution, which has been
proposed by the authors for testing purposes. The test statistic proposed by Kaur,
Prakasa Rao and Singh (1994) is an inﬁmum of random variables each with a stan-
dard normal distribution and they propose using the critical values from the standard
normal to reject the null hypothesis. We ﬁnd the test based on these critical values
overly conservative therefore generate simulated critical values under the null hy-
pothesis using the exponential distribution in Example 1 for both groups and 5,000
iterations. We obtained a simulated 5% critical value of .72 with a sample size of 20
for both groups and .96 with a sample size of 50. The power comparisons in Table 1
are based on these critical values.
As seen from Table 1, the test for distribution crossing is more powerful than
the others in most cases and its power rapidly improves with sample size. We also
14performed simulations with bigger samples and found that for m=n=100, the power
of this to be 1 in all three examples. We found no similar convergence for the other
two tests. Both the sign test and the SSD test do best in the second example when the
diﬀerence between the two distributions is marked. We do not test for second-order
stochastic dominance in the third example since no such dominance holds.
The Sign test does very badly in case 3 because the two distributions are almost
identical initially in this case. This is clear from Figure 3. We conclude that there
is a strong case for using the Chen test when we expect a single crossing of the two
distributions and when the distributions are fairly similar.
4 An Application to Data from an Indian Micro-
ﬁnance Program.
4.1 Data
Our data is from a microﬁnance program in the state of Jharkhand in India. Jhark-
hand is among the poorest of the 27 Indian states, with over half its population
below the national poverty line. The program is administered by PRADAN, a non-
government organization working in the area to form “self-help groups” of women.
These groups of between 10 and 20 women facilitate risk-sharing among their mem-
bers by saving a pre-determined minimum amount each week and lending accumu-
lated savings to members at terms determined by the group. Most groups eventually
establish a savings account at a commercial bank and take loans from the bank for
self-employment activities, mainly related to agriculture and livestock. There are
currently about 2,000 groups in operation in the Jharkhand.
We surveyed households in villages with newly formed groups and use the above
techniques to examine whether the program successfully targeted poor households
in the area. The sample consists of 576 households in 24 villages. The survey was
conducted over a period of two months starting in August 2002. The villages were
chosen from a set of 100 villages in which at least one group was formed during the
15period April 1st to June 30th, 2002. Very little lending takes place in the months
immediately following group formation and a comparison of the characteristics of
households in the program with those of other randomly chosen households in the
area can therefore be used to evaluate the extent to which the program targeted the
poor.
The 100 villages with new microcredit groups were partitioned into 4 geographical
clusters and simple random sample of 6 villages was drawn from each cluster. A total
of 24 respondents were surveyed from each of these villages- 6 of them members
of microcredit groups in the village and the remaining 18 randomly selected non-
members from the same village. The ratio of 1:3 for members and non-members
were chosen based on the prior belief that the group of non-participants is more
heterogeneous and unequal sample sizes would be required to obtain estimates of
similar accuracy for both groups.
Survey data were collected on a large number of economic indicators such as the
quantity and type of food consumed, the size and condition of the household’s main
dwelling, land owned and cultivated and the possession of durable goods. In addition,
respondents were asked about their contact with the government bureaucracy and
about any beneﬁts received from government sponsored programs. Responses to
these questions allowed for an assessment of whether the households excluded from
the program were also excluded from other oﬃcial poverty-alleviation programs.
We used a combination of household characteristics for a principal component
analysis. The ﬁrst principal component was used as a proxy for income. Table
2 contains group-wise summary statistics on household size, literacy rates and the
variables used to create the income index. Details on survey design and scoring
coeﬃcients for the index can be found in Somanathan (2003).
4.2 Results
As can be seen from Table 2, mean values of the index and its constituent components
are remarkably similar for the two groups. None of the group-wise diﬀerences seen in
the table are statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. The empirical distribu-
16Table 2: Group-wise Summary Statistics
Members Non-members
Household size 6.22 6.15
Literacy rate .39 .41
Meals consumed in the two 5.68 5.31
days prior to the survey
Household foodgrain consumption .
in normal times (kilograms) 3.82 3.97
Rooms in dwelling 3.06 3.35
land owned (hectares) 1.24 1.1
Value of livestock and durables 8642 9066
(Indian rupees)
Annual household expenditure on 3275 3428
clothing and footwear (Indian rupees)
Economic index -.021 .01
17tions of the income index for participants and non-participants are shown in Figure
4. While these also look similar, it does appear that the very poorest households
are predominantly outside the program; 2% of sampled group members and 5% of
non-members are below the 5th percentile of the index. We now apply some of the
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Figure 4: Empirical distribution functions for members and non-members of
microcredit groups in Jharkhand, India.
Table 3 contains computed test statistics and p-values for the Kolmogorov Smirnov
and Wilcoxon Mann Whitney tests for equality of these distributions. We use a
two-sided alternative in both these cases and ﬁnd that neither test rejects the null
hypothesis at the 5% level of signiﬁcance, although the Kolmogorov Smirnov test does
reject equality at the 10% level.
18Table 3: Preliminary Nonparametric Tests for Equal Distributions
Kolmogorov Wilcoxon
Smirnov Mann-Whitney
Value of the Statistic .125 .684
p-value .068 .49
Reject H0 at 5%? No No
Table 4 reports the critical values and test statistics from the sign test and the
test for distribution crossing. For the crossing point test we use the simulated 5
The distribution crossing test rejects the null of equal distributions against the
alternative of their crossing. Using the methodology outlined in Section 2, we estimate
of the crossing point x∗. The value of the income index at the crossing point is -1.19 ,
which is in the 15th percentile of the distribution of the index for the whole sample.
The sign test does not reject the null hypothesis of equal shares of members and non-
members for the poorest 5% if the population at the 5% level of signiﬁcance although
it does reject it at the 10% level.
4.3 Characteristics of Excluded Households
How poor are the households neglected by the program? Converting our income index
back into household characteristics allows us to compare lifestyles of these households
with others in the area. Table 5 presents means of selected variables for households
19Table 4: Tests for the Exclusion of Poor Households
Crossing Test Sign Test
Value of the Statistic 1.756 -1.61
Critical Value 1.529 -1.645
Reject H0 at 5%? Yes No
below the 5th percentile of the income index and other households. The poorest
households have dramatically diﬀerent lifestyles and consumption levels from the
rest of the sampled households. They live in smaller dwellings and eat fewer meals.
Their expenditure on clothing and footwear is about one-half of the mean for other
households, their food grain consumption (by weight) is lower by about one-third.
They spend less time in the village, although the diﬀerences here are small. The
households that are diﬃcult to involve in the microcredit program also seem to be
excluded from other public programs and the political process more generally. Only
7% of these households had ever approached a government oﬃcial compared to 28%
of other households. Perhaps the most striking observation is that the fraction of
households receiving subsidized foodgrains from a government anti-poverty program
was smaller for the poorest 5% than for the rest. The exclusion of these households
seems to extend far beyond microﬁnance programs!
20Table 5: Selected Household Characteristics: They Very Poor and the Rest
Poorest 5% Other Households
Meals consumed during the two 3.79 5.49
prior to the survey
Number of rooms 1.21 3.29
in dwelling
Foodgrain consumption per .5 .67
day in normal times (kilograms)
Annual expenditure on clothing 243 562
and footwear (rupees)
Land owned .29 1.17
(hectares)
Average months spent in the 10.8 11.09
household over the past year
Fraction ever approached .07 .28
government oﬃcial
Fraction received goverment .46 .52
subsidized foodgrains
215 Conclusions
This paper evaluates available nonparametric methods to test for whether the poorest
households in a population have been excluded from a program. Parametric tests,
which usually rely on some function of diﬀernces in the conditional means of two
groups, may not successfully detect these households if there is little prior information
on the income level of the households vulnerable to exclusion. We discuss three
alternative nonparametric methods that may be appropriate in this context and use
simulations with three diﬀerent pairs of income distributions to compare their power.
If the distributions of participants and non-participants exhibit a single crossing, we
ﬁnd that a test of distribution crossing, which explicitly uses this information, is
usually more powerful than competing procedures. This is especially true when the
distributions of the two groups are similar.
We apply some of the methods to a non-government microcredit program in India.
We ﬁnd evidence that the population distributions of program participants and non-
participants cross, with the poorest households largely outside the program. These
households also appear to have limited access to public programs which are, in prin-
ciple, designed for their beneﬁt: they are no more likely to be on oﬃcial poverty lists
and government-sponsored social programs.
226 Appendix
Test statistic for second-order stochastic dominance
Let X1,X2,Xn be a random sample from F and Y1,Y2,Ym be a random sample
from G. For a ﬁxed x ∈ [a,b] and for i = 1,2,...,n,
Ui(x) =
(
x − Xi if Xi < x,
0 otherwise
(4)
and for j = 1,2,...,m,
Vj(x) =
(


















































[Vi(x) − ¯ V (x)]
2




where zα is the upper α point of the standard normal distribution.
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